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Eighteenth-century Anglo-American prize systems were highly organized
enterprises for the provision of coerced labor. Offering whites opportunities to
participate in a lucrative market, they extended the reach of American slavery
beyond the shores of the Americas, reinforced slavery in North America and
greatly limited opportunities for freedom for black seamen. Although Americans
desired that their new nation provide greater individual liberty, the American prize
system applied the same presumption - that captured black mariners were slaves as had its British predecessor, resulting in the sale of hundreds of black seamen
into slavery.

	
  
On 26 June 1782 Obadiah Gale and Edward Carter entered James Esdall’s Burlington,
New Jersey house to be sold. The two men of African descent were seamen on the
Nancy, a sloop captured by the British privateer but thereafter recaptured by American
privateers. The Burlington Vice-Admiralty Court had adjudged Gale and Carter, along
with lumber and tar found on the Nancy, to be cargo that could be sold as prize goods.
Forty-one years earlier a similar scene had taken place in Boston. Five Spanish Negro
seamen captured by Captain Rouse’s privateer in the West Indies were sold as slaves to a
number of Bostonians.1
These two events, known only through a few lines in newspapers, appear to be
random occurrences: none of the Burlington participants had any known connection to
the individuals involved in the earlier case. The two episodes involved American,
Spanish and British seamen in different regions of the western Atlantic. And yet a consideration of so-called ‘Prize Negroes’ within the broader context of eighteenth- century
warfare makes it possible to understand better how Anglo-American prize systems
shaped freedom for Atlantic mariners who were of African descent or mixed racial
ancestry.2
Almost continual fighting occurred in the Atlantic between 1739 and 1783: the War of
Jenkins’ Ear, the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and finally the
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American Revolution. During these conflicts, British and American prize systems
inflicted considerable harm upon Britain and America’s enemies and enriched many
seamen, officers and ship owners. Anglo-American prize systems were also highly
organised enterprises for the provision of coerced labour that extended the reach of
American slavery beyond the shores of the Americas, reinforcing slavery in North
America and greatly limiting opportunities for freedom for black seamen.
In a period when nations did not have large standing navies, private war ships used
letters of marque to capture enemy ships. This mechanism provided a quick, low-cost
and effective means for increasing a nation’s maritime forces. After capturing an
enemy ship, privateers brought the vessel and its goods back to a friendly port to be
adjudged before a Vice-Admiralty court. If vessel and goods were deemed proper
prizes, they were sold, with the ship’s crew receiving the majority of the proceeds.
This system rewarded successful risk-taking. The willingness of private investors and
seamen to gamble their money and lives was the foundation of privateering.3
Many individuals profited from prize systems. Customs officials, naval officers,
seamen, prize agents, Vice-Admiralty court personnel, newspaper publishers, and
maritime vendors received considerable benefits from the sale of prizes. Investments in
privateer ships sold in small lots spread the gains. Boisterous sailors led processions
through city streets carrying privateer ensigns. Sailors, whose motto was ‘We’ll prizes
make of all we take’, readily abandoned naval and merchant berths for the promise of
prize monies. Privateer captains created fortunes for ship owners and compensation for
themselves far in excess of the wages they would have received as merchant shipmasters. The prospect of prize riches was dazzling to some; during wars the talk in
American ports was of nothing other than privateering. Between 1739 and 1748
New York’s cruisers employed more than 10,300 sailors; Newport sent a third of its
adult males privateering; and Philadelphia’s docks hosted 4,600 privateermen.4
Obtaining prize money attracted many, because the returns were high. Investors
could double their stakes. Prize agents, such as Barbadian Gedney Clarke, appointed to
sell captured booty and to distribute the proceeds fairly, could receive ‘large sums’ for
their services. Newspaper publishers profited from the publication of adver- tisements
proclaiming the sale of black seamen ‘found on board’ captured vessels. Admiralty
Court judges fattened their bank accounts with hefty fees for decreeing cap- tives as prize
goods. James Esdall and others who leased their properties for the sale of Prize Negroes
also profited from the enslavement of sailors.5
Prize systems not only enriched individuals but also played a significant role in supporting local economies. Western Atlantic ports often relied on plunder obtained by
their privateers. For example, during King George’s War, New York’s privateers captured seventy-nine ships resulting in prizes totaling £615,000. At the commencement of
the Revolution, Salem’s merchants converted their fishing vessels to privateers. The scores
of prizes these privateers brought into Salem sustained the port during the war.6
Anglo-American prize systems affected considerable numbers of black seamen
within the western Atlantic. Black mariners comprised nearly half of Bermuda’s sailors,
were commonplace in Antigua, and totalled almost 3 per cent of the crews on Royal
Navy ships on the North American station during the American Revolution.
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South Carolinian and Chesapeake planters regularly employed slaves as boatmen,
patroons, pilots and ship captains. Hundreds of black sailors were shipped from
British North America ports. A 1743 census of North American ships at Kingston disclosed 41 black seamen among the ships’ 135 mariners.7 The combination of a lack of
work for some slaves, the benefit of not having to pay a white seaman wages, and the
promise of substantial prize monies led some masters to risk the loss of their bondsmen, whether by enemy cannon or slave flight. Black mariners were particularly
numerous on privateers. The Newport privateer Revenge with four blacks – a cook,
mate’s servant, drummer and free seaman – was far from exceptional. With ship captains often desperate for crew members, many ‘encourage[d] Negroes to run away to sea’,
leading British colonial authorities to complain of ‘the wooly haired race’ filling vessels
and Spanish colonial officials bemoaning that their ports were ‘filling up with
foreigners’. Sailors of African descent could also be found on ships from Spanish
American ports, Curaçao, and the French West Indies.8
In a world where slavery was ubiquitous, people of African and mixed racial descent
were potential targets for Anglo-American ship captains, merchants and seamen
looking for easy profits. Ship captains regularly took black men from on land and
from vessels of all kinds, and sold them into slavery. Just as privateers profited from the
capture of whole slaving ships, they benefited by seizing vulnerable individuals
– none more so than persons of African descent – throughout the Atlantic world.9
In wartime in particular, the propensity to see blacks as ‘marketable commodities’
critical to ‘military success’ intensified. Ships of all nations regularly raided enemy
settlements to take away slaves; and, in response, naval ships patrolled coastlines to
prevent such incursions. Ship captains kidnapped black men either to sell them into
slavery or to coerce them into becoming mariners. Kidnappings of black mariners
were the subject of London plays, commentary by Samuel Johnson and appeared in an
early novel.10
Were abductions of black mariners by British and American ships random acts of
uncivilised behaviour confined largely to wartime or were they part of a larger pattern
pointing to the vulnerability of blacks being enslaved? The answer lies in the prevalence
of Prize Negroes throughout the eighteenth century. The Prize Negro sailors Captain
Rouse sold into slavery in 1741 were but the tip of an iceberg. Between 1721 and 1748
at least one hundred and thirty-five black mariners were con- demned as prize goods.
During the American Revolution, references to more than 250
Prize Negroes appeared in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, New Jersey and Rhode
Island newspapers. Overall, the number of Prize Negroes in North America from 1713 to
1783 is estimated to exceed 500.11 Condemning black seamen into slavery in North
American prize courts is prima facie evidence of Britons and Americans seeing these
men as subject to enslavement due to their skin colour.
Still, not every black mariner captured at sea was sold into slavery. When capturing an
enemy ship, privateering ship captains encountered the problem of what to do with as
many as 100 seamen. If the privateer had previously captured other ships the sailors it
placed on the vessels as prize crews would have reduced its crew. When faced with the
difficulties of, say, supervising prisoners, most ship captains, such as Captain
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Norton when he ‘landed’ 24 of a captured crew while retaining ‘7 Negroes and 3
Spaniards’, probably kept the ‘valuable negro men’ while releasing white prisoners.12
Notwithstanding the financial incentive involved in capturing black tars, some were
released: elderly cooks had limited value, and if a cruiser had just begun a voyage, the
burden of provisioning additional seamen for weeks or months was prohibitive.
Privateers with small crews often resorted to ransoming a captured ship to avoid
having to supervise prisoners. To evade the cost of court proceedings, some ship captains simply sold captured black men without going through proper legal channels.
With Prize Negroes enslaved during both the colonial era and the Revolution War, did
the British and American prize systems differ, and if so, how? A consideration of the two
systems’ procedures, black seamen’s opportunities to oppose prize proceedings and the
means black sailors used to resist their enslavement demonstrates that the two systems
were very similar, with a British black seaman having as much to fear from an American
privateer during the Revolution as a Spanish or French black sailor did from a British ship
in the colonial era. The reasons for this included standards of proof that favoured the
capturing ship, the speed of prize proceedings under both systems, black seamen’s very
limited ability to oppose the prize proceedings, restricted possibilities for black
seamen’s national governments to influence the outcome of prize cases and
circumscribed opportunities for black sailors to escape enslavement once con- demned
as prize goods.
British Colonial Prize System
Prize cases were commenced in British colonies by the filing of a libel with a ViceAdmiralty court seeking the condemnation of the captured ship and its cargo. Ship
captains were required to bring into port officers of the captured ship to permit their
answering standing interrogatories detailing the circumstances of the capture. Prize
captors only needed to establish ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the property was subject to
condemnation. The owner of a captured ship bore the burden of proving the contrary.
In cases where there was ‘heavy suspicion’ as to the veracity of a petition, procedures of the
time provided that rather than simply adjudicating the matter on the pleadings alone,
opponents of the libel were permitted to examine witnesses and administer
interrogatories.13 As written, such procedures seem quite reasonable. Their practical
effect was, however, to offer few free black sailors the opportunity to present an effective
defense in prize proceedings.
When captured black seamen appeared before Vice-Admiralty courts, the pervasive
presumption was that they were in fact slaves. The long-standing British policy was to
enslave black mariners regardless of whether or not they were free subjects of England’s
enemies. As New York Governor Hunter acknowledged in 1712, such men had been
enslaved ‘by reason of their colour’. The Governor refused to release the seamen, as
they provided no evidence other than ‘their own words’.14 While Vice-Admiralty courts
had the power to condemn as prizes only those who were enemy property, that is,
slaves when captured, judges typically ignored this constraint. In 1744 when Captain
Dennis sought to condemn a ‘Negro’ on the St Fermin, the Rhode Island
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Vice-Admiralty Court disregarded the testimony of the St. Fermin’s captain that the
sailor was a ‘free man’ and had him sold as a prize good. New York’s Vice-Admiralty
Court made similar decisions. Rarely did a Vice-Admiralty court express ‘some doubt’
whether captured black mariners were ‘Free or Slave’.15 In the absence of written documentation of free status, courts assumed the sailors to be slaves.
Once condemned as Prize Negroes, free black seamen faced daunting hurdles to
regain their free status. Courts often offered little recourse to captured black mariners.
Typically, notices of Vice-Admiralty hearings to condemn Prize Negroes appeared in
newspapers within 10 days of seamen being brought into port. Most prize proceedings
were uncontested and rapidly dispatched. The 11 ‘Negroes’ Captain Dennis sent to
Boston in 1744 were peremptorily condemned as prize goods the same day they
arrived in port. Such expeditious proceedings occurred frequently. Even when black
mariners presented written testimony of their free status, Vice-Admiralty courts barred
their release. For example, in 1749 New York’s Vice-Admiralty Court held that an
affidavit attesting to a seamen’s free status was insufficient because it did not come
from the seaman’s place of birth.16 Such procedural roadblocks to freedom were
common.
The barriers that kept Prize Negroes from re-obtaining freedom were not solely due to
Vice-Admiralty court procedures. White purchasers of black seamen often went to
extraordinary lengths to keep the men from returning to their homes. Slave owners
employed a variety of methods to keep Prize Negroes from proceeding with freedom
suits, including placing their bondsmen in workhouses, locking them in private homes
or secreting them in the countryside.17
While depriving enemies of skilled maritime labour, the British prize system also
served to support British colonists’ own labour needs. During the conflicts with Spain
many indentured servants enlisted in the armed forces. At the same time slave imports
into British North American colonies slowed considerably. New York and
Pennsylvania’s experiences illustrate this decline well. New York’s average annual slave
imports fell from 177 slaves in the period between 1713 and 1775 to
37 slaves from 1740 to 1748. Pennsylvania experienced a similarly sharp fall in slave
imports. While only 10 slaves were imported annually into Pennsylvania from 1743 to
1748, in the 5 years prior to the conflict an average of 71 slaves were annually
imported. In such circumstances Prize Negroes served as useful replacements.18
The British prize system affected the lives of all black mariners, both those caught in its
claws and those not yet drawn into the system. Its very presence caused black
seaman and their masters to take steps to limit the risk of condemnation as prize
goods. Among Bermuda’s large enslave black mariner population it was ‘very
customary’ for slave sailors to carry papers asserting their status as free men. They did
so ‘in Case they should be taken by the Enemy’. Even some young black boys on
North American vessels carried certificates from their masters identifying them as ‘free’.
With no place to hide when confronted at sea, black sailors hoped that these passes
might protect them when brought before a prize court. The passes often provided
limited protection. Colonial governors argued that mariners may
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have forged the certificates and refused to release captured black seamen without
additional proof of free status, often impossible to obtain when hundreds of miles
away from home.19
Black sailors who were condemned as prize goods were generally isolated and
removed from family and friends, but occasionally they created new communities. The
most notable social network of Prize Negroes in the colonial era involved Spanish
sailors in New York during the 1730s to 1750s. Scores of Spanish seamen, mostly of
African descent, passed through Justice Lewis Morris’s Vice-Admiralty Court before
congregating on the city’s congested streets, drinking and socialising together. Their
numbers included six Spanish black seamen charged in 1741 with con- spiracy to
overthrow New York’s government, Juan Miranda, a black seaman who was coercively
kept in the city for more than 20 years as a slave although never formally condemned,
and ‘Negro Mingo’ who attempted to seize control of a Bermudian boat sailing from
New York.20 This social network was undoubtedly a response to the sailors’ isolation
and British colonists’ hatred of Spaniards. As one New York news- paper dispatch noted,
‘there are many [Spanish Negroes] in this place’, who, if the Spanish or French
invaded the colony, would ‘rise and join’ Britain’s enemies.21 In the 1740s, concerns
over Spanish intentions and anti-Catholic bias led many whites to take seriously
Georgia Governor Oglethorpe’s warning that ‘Spaniards had imployed Emissaries to
burn all the Magazines and considerable Towns in the English North America’. In an
environment where both skin colour and nationality rendered Prize Negroes
suspicious, Spanish black seamen naturally combined to make their enslavement a
little more bearable.22
The enslavement of Prize Negroes had unintended circumstances. Spanish Prize
Negroes often were leaders in resisting slavery in British North America. As with the
four Spanish Negroes who murdered the crew of the ship transporting them as
prizes, many captured Spanish black seamen believed that ‘they were born Freemen, and
made Slaves by the English during the War, and had no other Way left of getting their
Liberty’. This strong belief in their free status resulted in Spanish Negroes organising
other slaves to flee. Their leadership sometimes involved violent attacks. The ‘great
number of Spanish’ black mariners, who, along with ‘other Prize Negroes’ rioted in
Newport in 1743, believed that violence was an effective means to regaining their
freedom. These men’s violence speaks both to their frustration at being enslaved, as
well as the frequency with which British ship captains enslaved Spanish black sailors.23
Prize Negroes also understood that their maritime experience made them ideal candidates for employment on North American privateers. With many ship captains
lacking full crews during wartime, captains often recruited, as Jeffrey Bolster has
noted, with ‘more of an eye to muscle than complexion’. Willing to hire runaway
slaves and free blacks, shipmasters often proved amenable to employing Prize Negroes
such as the ex-Spanish privateerman George who ‘endeavour[ed] to get on board some
Vessel’.24 Other former Prize Negroes, such as two groups of ‘Spanish Negroes’
belonging to John Cannon, chose to flee enslavement by stealing sloops and small
boats.25
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The enslavement of Spanish black sailors also affected relationships between English
and Spanish governments. For example, in 1746 when Newport ship captain William
Dennis had 22 Spanish prisoners sold as slaves based on their skin colour, Havana’s
Governor protested. The Governor not only exchanged acerbic letters with his
counterpart, but also had 19 of Captain Dennis’ men taken hostage. Officials in Rhode
Island, New York and Pennsylvania scrambled to recover the Spanish black sailors so
that Dennis’ seamen could be freed. Contacting Spanish governmental offi- cials was
usually critical to obtaining freedom, but it was not failsafe. As Santiago, a free Spanish
black man, captured by a British vessel and sold in Rhode Island found out, sometimes
a slave owner’s connections could trump Spanish governmental auth- ority. In the same
year as the nine ‘Spanish Negroes’ in Rhode Island gained their freedom through the
intercession of the Governor of Havana, a Rhode Island master sent Santiago on a
voyage to the West Indies. He attempted to escape in Havana. Unfortunately for
Santiago, his master’s business associate in Cuba had him recaptured and sold, despite
evidence that ‘he [wa]s a Free Man’.26
Prize Negroes who were successful in obtaining their freedom under the British
colonial prize system often had to engage in lengthy endeavours to do so; some cases
lasted for more than a decade. Most of those who were successful had either the
assistance of the Spanish government or that of the New York Attorney General, but
what was most noteworthy about these seamen’s struggles was that they resulted in a
sea-change in how prize cases were handled by Vice-Admiralty courts in North
America. Although black seamen were condemned as Prize Negroes during the Seven
Years War, the numbers of such enslaved mariners was but a fraction of those who lost
their freedom in previous wars. This was largely due to the fact, that in response to
the numerous freedom suits filed in the 1740s and 1750s, Vice-Admiralty courts began to
place the burden of proof on libellants and not captured seamen as to whether the
sailors were free or enslaved subjects of their native lands.27 Unfortunately for black
mariners, this change was not to be adopted by American admiralty judges.
American Prize System
Three decades after scores of black Spanish mariners were enslaved through the efforts of
privateers operating under British letters of marque, the new American nation faced a
decision about developing a maritime force to combat the formidable Royal Navy.
Although by November 1776 the Continental Navy had 13 ships, the majority had
very short fighting lives, with almost all out of commission by 1779. Lacking a strong
naval presence Americans relied upon privateers. Congress established a prize system
adapting British legal and maritime precedents. When it authorised pri- vateers to seize
‘all Goods’ on British ships, it did not define the phrase ‘goods’. Instead, letters of marque
issued to privateers provided that the legitimacy of a prize was to be determined by ‘usage
in such cases at the Port’. Although Congress provided that ‘all persons taken in arms
on board any prize be deemed prisoners’ and treated ‘with humanity’, neither
American ship captains nor courts of admiralty interpreted this res- olution to require
that black mariners be treated as prisoners of war. Instead, rather
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than establishing a new American jurisprudence emphasising individual liberty, Amer- ican
courts of admiralty followed British ‘usage’ from the first half of the eighteenth
century.28
Given that Congressional rules provided for local determinations of the condemning of prizes, variations in how courts treated captured black sailors can be expected.
Uniformity largely reigned, however, with only Massachusetts rejecting the presump- tion
that black tars were slaves. As early as 1776 the Massachusetts Legislature prohib- ited the
sale of two black ‘prisoners taken on the high seas’ as being ‘in violation of the natural
rights alike vested in all men by their Creator’. Six years later the Massachusetts ViceAdmiralty court offered 70 captured Bermudian slave mariners their freedom.
Apparently, the court was unwilling to assume that a black seaman should be enslaved in
a state with a constitution providing equal rights for all men.29 Yet the Massachu- setts
exception did not save many black tars from enslavement. The 1776 legislative
resolution simply put privateer captains on notice to steer clear of Massachusetts
when they had black seamen to be condemned; and many did. With British forces
occupying Newport and New York for most of the Revolution, American privateers
brought prizes to Delaware River ports such as Philadelphia, Burlington and Trenton
where judges proved quite willing to condemn scores of black sailors as prize goods.
Admiralty Court judges in Delaware River ports, as well as Williamsburg and Providence worked from the assumption that a black mariner was a slave. Whether they
were captured on a British merchant ship, found working on a British supply sloop, or
members of a Bermudian privateer, black sailors were treated as property appropriate for
sale as prize goods.30
Most prize proceedings during the American Revolution were uncontested and
rapidly dispatched. For Tom and other young black boys captured at sea, such expeditious proceedings in which they found themselves appraised and sold by strangers
within a matter of days must have been quite alienating.31 Fewer than a dozen captured black sailors avoided being condemned as prizes. In each case prize courts
released these men only because their American owners provided proof of ownership.
In contrast to the expeditious condemnation of captured black mariners as prize
goods, American officials could take considerable care to ensure the return of slaves
recaptured from enemy ships to their American owners. In 1779, 34 slaves taken
from South Carolinian plantations by a British privateer were recaptured by the Massachusetts naval ships the Hazard and Tyrannicide. When the prize ship and the slaves
were brought into Boston, the Board of War appointed a three-person committee to
resolve what to do with the captured Negroes. The committee issued a resolution
directing the Board of War to notify Congress of the facts of the case and to have
the Negroes housed in barracks on Castle Island. The committee sought to have Congress give the information to the South Carolinian delegates so ‘proper measures may be
taken for the return of said Negroes, agreeable to their desire’.32
For black tars, such as the two Virginians who escaped onto a British frigate, later
transferred to a British merchant ship, then captured by an American privateer and
returned to their owners by the Norfolk Vice-Admiralty Court, America’s prize
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system represented governmental support of the slave system they sought to escape. By
returning captured fugitives to their former owners, American prize courts emphasised property rather than individual rights in the same way that colonial British ViceAdmiralty courts had.33
Despite American courts’ concern for whites’ property rights in their bondsmen,
expeditious resolution and payment of prize monies appeared to take precedent in
the Revolutionary prize courts. Thus, although clearly slaves of a Bermudian, James
Jackson and Jacob Smith found themselves sold as prize goods in Virginia within a
week of notice of their sale.34 Such quick sales gave owners of black seamen, American or
other nationalities, little time to compile the necessary paperwork, hire a proctor and
file opposition papers.
As the British prize system did during earlier colonial conflicts, the American prize
system during the Revolution provided bondsmen for Americans at a time when the
usual sources of slaves were unavailable. From 1776 to 1782 only a single African slave ship
entered a port in the 13 former colonies. With hundreds of slaves fleeing across British
lines, and many indentured servants enlisting in the military, colonists who desired
bound labour had limited choices; Prize Negroes captured by American priva- teers made
handy replacement workers. Thus, while some northern states enacted gradual
abolition laws and some whites were willing to offer freedom to enslaved mar- iners, other
whites preferred to profit from Prize Negroes.35
The conflict with Great Britain caused considerable fear among whites about slave
flight. Hundreds of slaves fled their owners via the sea. Fugitive slaves in the Chesapeake area regularly stole small boats to flee to Wilmington, Philadelphia, or Royal
Navy ships. Black sailors assisted Loyalists in attacking rebels; when a Philadelphia privateer captured the sloop Lady Susan as it sought to ‘join the British fleet under Lord
Dunmore’, it seized seven Bermudian enslaved mariners. The selling of black mariners as
prizes served as a means of limiting maritime flight and combating British forces. In their
anxious response to such individuals fleeing to and fighting for British forces,
American authorities often made no distinction in their treatment of fugitive slaves,
enslaved sailors, and free black mariners. All were viewed as agents of instability who
needed to be restrained.36
During the Revolution, Prize Negroes found re-obtaining freedom very difficult.
Britain had little interest in arranging exchanges of captured privateer crews. Nor did
British officials make efforts such as Spanish representatives had done earlier in the
century to assist captured black mariners. This was probably due to Britain viewing the
war as a civil uprising and being unwilling to acknowledge or confer in any manner
legitimacy upon American admiralty courts. Moreover, the nature of the Revolution
made captured seamen obtaining documentation to demonstrate one’s free status very
complicated. With British ships controlling much of the Atlantic coastline and opposing
armies often between where a captured sailor was brought and his home port, quick
communication with relatives and friends was often not possible. When combined with
the expeditiousness of prize proceedings, these factors guaran- teed that captured black
tars had little chance in effectively opposing petitions seeking their sale.
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Prize Negroes were able to resist their enslavement (or re-enslavement) by more traditional means – flight. Enslaved black mariners put their maritime experiences to
good use. Men such as Patrick Dennis, a Negro ‘taken in the prize sloop Racehorse’,when
they fled their new slave masters, headed for ports ‘in hopes of making his escape in
some of the vessels there ready to sail’. For Dennis, he sought to find freedom on a
ship leaving Wilmington. Other Prize Negroes headed to New York.37
Such flight was not always successful. Some who fled by stealing an armed boat,
found themselves captured when serving on a Loyalist galley and then sold as a Prize
Negro.38
During the American Revolution, black mariners typically viewed American, and not
British, ships as coercive tools of tyrannical power. When captured by Royal Navy
vessels, James Forten and other black mariners were offered employment. Men such
as Anthony Mingus, a ‘Spanish Negro’ captured by HMS Brune, had lengthy careers
in the Royal Navy.39 Captured black seamen who declined service ended up in British
prisons, perhaps to die a slow death, but rarely sold into slavery. Americans treated
captured black tars very differently. American courts of admiralty ensured that
patriotic seamen got their just rewards of prize monies but captured black mariners
had limited opportunities to safeguard their freedom. Aboli- tionists convinced the
Pennsylvania legislature to provide for gradual emancipation, but the fate of Prize
Negroes condemned at the State House and sold at the Coffee House in Philadelphia
failed to capture their attention. For whatever reason – a com- bination of patriotism,
economics, and racism – Americans accepted a governmen- tally sanctioned system
whereby captured black seamen were enslaved simply on the basis of their skin colour.
As a result, during the Revolution the Atlantic Ocean between South Carolina and
New York was a transition zone where freedom for blacks on both sides of the
conflict was fluid and where freedom for many black mar- iners was usually fleeting.40
The capture and recapture of ships, the contingencies of war, and the attitudes of
individual captains all made freedom at sea a game of roulette over which black mariners
had little control. For those black sailors sold at Philadel- phia’s Coffee House in the
waning years of the American Revolution, the vibrant black community that James
Forten, Richard Allen, Absalom Jones and others would forge was a far-off dream too
bitter to contemplate.
Conclusion
For Obadiah Gale and the hundreds of other black mariners sold into slavery during
the American Revolution, the newly established American prize system was little
different from its British colonial predecessor. Both systems presumed that blackness
equaled enslavement. The two systems each allowed little opportunity for captured
mariners to establish that they were free, although in the earlier colonial system the
absence of large-scale enemy forces nearby made it easier for the captured men to
contact friends and governmental officials to seek assistance. Even when Prize Negroes
were able to obtain governmental assistance, they still found themselves enslaved for
considerable periods of time. With both systems predicated upon a
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desire to develop maritime forces through awarding prize monies, little priority was
given to black mariners’ individual liberty. As a result, British and American prize
systems ensured that going to sea involved anxiety for black seamen and their loved
ones.
The practice of enslaving captured black mariners died slowly. During America’s
undeclared wars with European powers in the 1790s, Prize Negroes continued to be
sold in American ports. While their numbers never reached the levels seen in the
1740s and the Revolutionary era, Americans continued condemning Prize Negroes
until the end of the eighteenth century. The American prize system, as did its British
colonial predecessor, in acting to limit black seamen’s mobility and restrict their
freedom, were precursors for the harsh Negro Seamen’s Acts enacted in the nine- teenth
century.41
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Warfare’, 362; Roscoe, Studies in the History of the Admiralty and Prize Courts, 57; Bride nbaugh,
ed., Gentleman’s Progress, 136 41.
[5] Rodger, The Wooden World, 159 60; Pennsylvania Packet or General Advertiser, Oct. 11, 1781; Smith,
‘Gedney Clarke of Salem and Barbados’, 517 18; Appointments of Prize Agents, 1779
80, The National Archives, Kew, UK, (‘TNA’) HCA 49/96; New Jersey Gazette, Oct. 27, 1779;
New York Gazette, Mar. 11, 1740.
[6] Starkey et al., Pirates and Privateers, 5; Lydon, ‘The Role of Privateering Down to 1763’, 14 15; Vickers,
Young Men and the Sea, 165.
[7] Jarvis, ‘Maritime Masters and Seafaring Slaves in Bermuda, 1680 1783’, 599; Gaspar, Bondsmen and
Rebels, 110 13, 138, 286 87n51; Morgan, ‘Black Life in Eighteenth Century Charleston’,
187 232; Wood, Black Majority, 203, 230 31; and Foy, ‘Ports of Slavery, Ports of Freedom’, App.
D; Edward Trelawney Letter to Lords of Admiralty, Dec. 21, 1743, TNA ADM 1/3917. My
database of eighteenth century black Atlantic mariners now totals more 15,750.
[8] Proceedings of the Court of Vice Admiralty of Virginia, 98 113; Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers,
1739 1748, 23, 34, 49; Vezian, ‘Journal of a Privateersman’, 358 359; Towle, Records of the Vice
Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 174, 185 6, 194, 258, 301 2, 313, 328, 331, 458; Clayton,
‘Life at Sea’, 22; Letter from Thomas Franklin to John Cleveland, Esq., April 28,
1757, TNA ADM 1/306; Boston Evening Post, Oct. 17, 1748 and Aug. 23, 1762. Black
seamen on French and Spanish ships included slaves captured from North American vessels.
Talty, Empire of Blue Water, 86 7.
[9] Privateers, pirates and naval vessels captured more than 1,000 eighteenth century slaving ships.
Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database (‘TASD’).
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[10] Boston Post Boy, June 9, 1740; Prize Cases, 1757 1763, Box 2, National Archives, Northeast
Region; Frey, ‘Between Slavery and Freedom’, 394 6; Letter from Admiral Romney to Gov. of
Porto Bello, 30 July 1772, in The Romney Papers, Vol. II, 98; Bolster, Black Jacks, 31; TNA
SP/89/75/41; Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb. 1749, pp. 89 90; ‘Penrose Journal’, National Mari
time Museum (‘NMM’), Greenwich, United Kingdom, REG 06/00413.5, 64; Jarvis, In the Eye of all
Trade, 245.
[11] The records of Vice Admiralty courts are incomplete. New London’s prize records were burnt,
while the records for several other ports cannot be located. These factors, combined with the
considerable number of newspaper references to Prize Negroes and that captured black seamen
were sometimes exchanged at sea, makes 500 a conservative estimate.
[12] Boston Evening Post, Nov. 30, 1741.
[13] Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, iv.
[14] Scott, ‘The Slave Insurrection of 1712’, 61. In contrast to British practices, Spanish courts often
accepted the words of fellow mariners as to the free status of black seamen. Zabin, Dangerous
Economies, 126. [New para]British enslavement of captured black seaman dates to at least 1688
when privateer Robert Searle plundered St. Augustine. Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 136.
[15] Towle, Records of the Vice Admiralty Court, 243, 305; Hough, Reports of Cases, 199 200; ‘John
Baptiste LaVille’, RG 21, Prize Cases, 1757 63, Box 2, National Archives, Northeastern Region;
American Weekly Mercury, Aug. 25, 1743. In 1741 when Prize Negroes asserted they had been free
when captured at sea and presented evidence New Yorkers were aware the black mariners had
been free, their testimony was given no credence. Horsmanden, The New York Conspiracy,
154 62.
[16] Hough, Reports of Cases, 31 2.
[17] Petition of Juan Miranda, Oct. 10, 1758 and Petition of Hilario Antonio, May 15, 1756, Folder
160, Parish Transcripts, N YHS; Petition of de la Torre, [n.d.], Kempe Papers, box 4, N YHS.
[18] Foy, ‘Ports of Slavery, Ports of Freedom’, Tables 1 2 and 2 2.
[19] Boston News Letter, July 26, 1744; Morgan, ‘Encounters with Africans and African Americans’,
195. In Curacoa temporary manumissions ‘pro forma to sail’ were issued to slave mariners to
protect them at sea. Rupert, ‘Marronage, Manumission and Maritime Trade’, 373.
[20] Parish Transcripts, Box ‘New York’, folder 160, N YHS; Juan Miranda vs Cornelius Van Ranst, Sarah
Van Ranst (Supreme Ct. of Judicature, 1758), John Tabor Kempe Papers, Box 5, N YHS; The King
v Dick, a Negro, (1745), Vice Admiralty Ct. Records, Bermuda Archives.
[21] New York Weekly Journal, June 15, 1741; Scott, ‘The Slave Insurrection of 1712’, 61. [22]
Wood, Black Majority, 205.
[23] Pennsylvania Gazette, April 13, 1749; New York Gazette or Weekly Post Boy, Jan. 23, 1749; Boston
Gazetteer or Weekly Journal, Aug. 1, 1749; American Weekly Mercury, Aug. 25, 1743.
[24] Bolster, ‘To Feel Like a Man’, 1179; New York Gazette Revived in the Weekly Post Boy, Oct. 2,
1749. See also New Jersey Gazette, May 1, 1782; Pennsylvania Gazette, Jul. 2, 1782.
[25] American Weekly Mercury, Feb. 7, 1721 and Oct. 12, 1732; New York Gazette, Jan. 30, 1732. [26]
Bartlett, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 4: 12 and 5: 176;
Boston News Letter, May 1, July 26, 1746; Deed of Sale, 3 July 1744, Rhode Island Historical
Society, MSS 9003.
[27] Zabin, Dangerous Economies, 124 31. Examples of ‘Prize Negroes’ in the period after 1759
include ‘Solida’, RG 21 Prize Cases, 1762, Box 3, folio 17, National Archives, Northeastern
Region; New York Mercury, June 6, 1763; New York Gazette (Weyman’s), Aug. 29, 1763.
[28] Congressional Resolution, March 23, 1776, Evans Early American Imprint, Series 1, no. 15135;
Congressional Resolution, May 21, 1776, Evans Early American Imprint, Series 1, no. 15142; Apr.
10, 1780 Letter of Marque to Phoenix, Admiralty Papers, June Dec. 1780, Coll. 144, Box 3,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA (‘HSP’).
[29] Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade, III: 77 8; Jarvis, Maritime
Masters, 585 6.
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[30] Newport Mercury, Sept. 16, 1776; Providence Gazette and Country Journal, Aug. 22, 1778;
Virginia Gazette, Aug. 7, 1779.
[31] June 29, 1780 appraisal, Admiralty Court Papers, HSP, Coll. 144, Box 3. See also, Jones v Sloop
Vulcan, Case No. 4, The Revolutionary War Prize Cases, Court of Appeals, 1776 1787; David
Library of the American Revolution, Washington’s Crossing, PA, Film 5, Reel 1.
[32] Adriance, Vice Admiralty Ct, New York, 1779, TNA HCA 32/262/1/1 26.
[33] Pennsylvania Evening Post, May 25, 1776; Pennsylvania Packet or General Advertiser, June 3,
1776; Admiralty Court Papers, 1776, Coll. 144, Box 2 and Coll. 1389, Box 6, HSP; NDAR V:
477. The desire to expeditiously adjudicate Prize Negro cases resulted in some privateers not
being required to provide their commissions to Vice Admiralty courts. See, e.g., Towle, Records
of the Vice Admiralty Court, 400.
[34] Virginia Gazette, Aug. 7, 1779.
[35] TASD, Voyage #24759.
[36] Naval Documents of the American Revolution (‘NDAR’), vol. 5: 718, 7: 1148, 1195 6, 9: 757, 10:
103, 113, 474, 498; Baltimore Advertiser (Goodard), July 27, 1779; Virginia Gazette, Oct. 10,
1777.
[37] Pennsylvania Evening Post, Feb. 4, 1777.
[38] Independent Gazeteer, Mar. 22, 1783.
[39] Mingus’s naval career can be followed in HMS Brune Muster, 1777, TNA ADM 36/7756; HMS
Brune Paybook, 1778, TNA ADM 34/93; HMS Lizard Muster, 1778 9, TNA ADM 36/8576;
HMS Courageux Muster Rolls, 1779 80, TNA ADM 36/8309 10; HMS Courageux Pay Book,
1780, TNA ADM 34/189 90; HMS Courageux Muster Roll, 1781 3, TNA ADM 36/
8727.
[40] In contrast to American negotiators who insisted that the British should not ‘carry away any
Negroes’ at the end of the Revolution, British negotiators did not demand that wrongly con
demned free black seamen be given their freedom. In this regard, the Paris of Treaty can be
said to be a victory for American property rights over the individual liberties of black mariners.
[41] Bolster, Black Jacks, 206 8. Examples of Prize Negroes in the 1790s include Loundon’s Register, May
31, 1793; Philadelphia Gazette & Universal Daily Advertiser, July 31, 1799; Centinel of Freedom,
Aug. 6, 1799; Courier, Aug. 14, 1799; Frederick and Charles Kinnier, Undated Paper,
Admiralty Court Papers, 1787 97, HSP, Coll. 144, Box 5.
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